Introduction to

Text Linguistics

 

  

Robert-Alain de Beaugrande

 Universidade Federal da Paraíba

 

Wolfgang Dressler

 Universität Wien  

   

  XIV Congress of Linguists, Berlin 1987

Original 1981

Digitally reformatted 2002

 

Contents

0  Foreword               vi  

I Basic notions

Textuality. The seven standards of textuality: cohesion; coherence; intentionality; acceptability; informativity; situationality; intertextuality. Constitutive versus regulative principles: efficiency; effectiveness; appropriateness.

II. The evolution of text linguistics

Historical background of text linguistics: rhetoric; stylistics; literary studies; anthropology; tagmemics; sociology; discourse analysis; functional sentence perspective. Descriptive structural linguistics: system levels; Harris’s discourse analysis; Coseriu’s work on settings; Harweg’s model of substitution; the text as a unit above the sentence. Transformational grammar: proposals of Heidolph and Isenberg; the Konstanz project; Petöfi’s text-structure/world-structure theory; van Dijk’s text grammars; Mel’cuk’s text-meaning model; the evolving notion of transformation.

III. The procedural approach

 Pragmatics. Systems and systemization. Description and explanation. Modularity and interaction. Combinatorial explosion. Text as a procedural entity. Processing ease and processing depth. Thresholds of termination. Virtual and actual systems. Cybernetic regulation. Continuity. Stability. Problem solving: depth-first search, breadth-first search, and means-end analysis. Mapping. Procedural attachment. Pattern-matching. Phases of text production: planning; ideation; development; expression; parsing; linearization and adjacency. The phases of text reception: parsing; concept recovery; idea recovery; plan recovery. Reversibility of production and reception. Sources for procedural models: artificial intelligence; cognitive psychology; operation types.

IV. Cohesion

The function of syntax. The surface text in active storage. Closely-knit patterns: phrase, clause, and sentence. Augmented transition networks. Grammatical dependencies. Rules as procedures. Micro-states and macro-states. Hold stack. Re-using patterns: recurrence; partial recurrence; parallelism; paraphrase. Compacting patterns: pro-forms; anaphora and cataphora; ellipsis; trade-off between compactness and clarity. Signalling relations: tense and aspect; updating; junction: conjunction, disjunction, contrajunction, and subordination; modality. Functional sentence perspective. Intonation.

V. Coherence

Meaning versus sense. Non-determinacy, ambiguity, and polyvalence. Continuity of senses. Textual worlds. Concepts and relations. Strength of linkage: determinate, typical, and accidental knowledge. Decomposition. Procedural semantics. Activation. Chunks and global patterns. Spreading activation. Episodic and semantic memory. Economy. Frames, schemas, plans, and scripts. Inheritance. Primary and secondary concepts. Operators. Building a text-world model. Inferencing. The world-knowledge correlate. Reference.

VI. Intentionality and acceptability

Intentionality. Reduced cohesion. Reduced coherence. The notion of intention across the disciplines. Speech act theory. Performatives. Grice’s conversational maxims: cooperation, quantity, quality, relation, and manner. The notions of action and discourse action. Plans and goals. Scripts. Interactive planning. Monitoring and mediation. Acceptability. Judging sentences. Relationships between acceptability and grammaticality. Acceptance of plans and goals.

 VII. Informativity

Attention. Information theory. The Markov chain. Statistical versus contextual probability. Three orders of informativity. Triviality, defaults, and preferences. Upgrading and downgrading. Discontinuities and discrepancies. Motivation search. Directionality. Strength of linkage. Removal and restoration of stability. Classifying expectations: the real world; facts and beliefs; normal ordering strategies; the organization of language; surface formatting; text types; immediate context. Negation. Definiteness. A newspaper article and a sonnet. Expectations on multiple levels. Motivations of non-expectedness.

VIII. Situationality

Situation models. Mediation and evidence. Monitoring versus managing. Dominances. Noticing. Normal ordering strategies. Frequency. Salience. Negotiation. Exophora. Managing. Plans and scripts. Planboxes and planbox escalation. A trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness. Strategies for monitoring and managing a situation.

IX. Intertextuality

Text types versus linguistic typology. Functional definitions: descriptive, narrative, and argumentative texts; literary and poetic texts; scientific and didactic texts. Using and referring to well-known texts. The organization of conversation. Problems and variables. Monitoring and managing. Reichman’s coherence relations. Discourse-world models. Recalling textual content. Effects of the schema. Trace abstraction, construction, and reconstruction. Inferencing and spreading activation. Mental imagery and scenes. Interactions between text-presented knowledge and stored world-knowledge. Textuality in recall experiments.

 X. Research and schooling

Cognitive science: the skills of rational human behaviour; language and cognition. Defining intelligence. Texts as vehicles of science. Sociology. Anthropology. Psychiatry and consulting psychology. Reading and readability. Writing. Literary studies: de-automatization; deviation; generative poetics; literary criticism as downgrading. Translation studies: literal and free translating; equivalence of experience; literary translating. Contrastive linguistics. Foreign-language teaching. Semiotics. Computer science and artificial intelligence. Understanding understanding.  

References

    0. Foreword

  1. At the 1976 summer meeting of the Societas Linguistica Europaea, we agreed to prepare an updated translation of Prof. Dressler’s Einführung in die Textlinguistik (1972a) which has been well received. During the task of surveying and integrating new research since 1972, we came to realize that our plan was not realistic. In their quest for new theories and methods, recent trends have led to fundamentally changed conditions for a science of texts, rather than to a mere extension of older methods to a new object of inquiry. This evolution has been marked by interdisciplinary co-operation far more than traditional linguistics had been.

2. We accordingly developed a completely new plan and format for our introductory survey.1 We stress here at the outset that we have by no means been exhaustive or definitive in our treatment of the issues. We were often dealing with newly emerging questions whose resolution will demand many years of concerted research. Still, we thought it would be useful to mention such questions and to suggest some reasonable answers. We will be quite content if our book proves serviceable as a guide in a period of rapid transition and change.

3. Any transitional study of multi-disciplinary issues is bound to evoke controversy. Some partisans may deny the value of text linguistics altogether and insist that sentence linguistics is the proper domain of investigation.2 Others may wish to admit texts without altering the established methods.3 Even those who will accept profound alterations may disagree about the best new directions to pursue.4 In our view, the nature of texts as communicative occurrences should decide what methods are used, irrespective of personal or institutional commitments made in the past. In practice, our approach is intended more to complement traditional ones than to compete with them. We often address issues which older approaches made no claims to encompass.

4. Thomas Kuhn (1970) has contributed enormously to public awareness of the extent to which activities in “normal science” are controlled by conventions among the scientists rather than the manifest nature of the objects of inquiry. That predicament is egregiously acute in linguistics, where the object is so diversified and flexible. Hardly an aspect of human thought, action, and interaction is not permeated to some degree by language. We cannot escape being reductive in our theories and models. Yet we must bear in mind that reductions are temporary, undesirable conditions to be removed as soon as it is feasible. We may even find that an integrated, comprehensive approach actually leads to a simpler account of language overall than a fragmented, restricted one: preoccupation with exactness of detail in isolated domains can block our vision for sweeping correlations across the whole spectrum (cf. X.29).

5. A young science like linguistics would understandably seek to align itself with older sciences like physics, mathematics, and formal logic. But communication, like any human activity, has its own special physical, mathematic, and logical properties that must not be overlooked. An unduly rigid application of notions from the “exact” sciences could dehumanize the object to the point where the inquiry becomes irrelevant. A formalism is a representation, not an explanation, and a means, not an end. The analysis of formal structures might well fail to uncover the nature and function of an entity in its wider context.

6. The terms and notions of linguistics often attest to ambitions of scientific, logical, and mathematical rigor. Yet their uncritical acceptance on those grounds alone could be dangerous. A science of texts demands its own terms and notions because of the nature of its object. Probabilistic models are more adequate and realistic than deterministic ones.

Dynamic accounts of structure-building operations will be more productive than static descriptions of the structures themselves. We should look to discover regularities, strategies, motivations, preferences, and defaults rather than rules and laws. Dominances can offer more realistic classifications than can strict categories. Acceptability and appropriateness are more crucial standards for texts than grammaticality and well-formedness. Human reasoning processes are more essential to using and conveying knowledge in texts than are logical proofs. It is the task of science to systemize the fuzziness of its objects of inquiry, not to ignore it or argue it away.5

7. As remarked by Thomas Kuhn (1970: 136-43), textbooks generally create the impression that all discovery and research in a science has been leading up to the constellation of theories and issues we consider important today. Any other mode of presentation would confuse the learner with a disunited array of quarrels, many of which are not relevant in our modern perspective. In the present book, we devote some space to comparing the “paradigm” of text linguistics with older paradigms; yet we too are compelled to maintain a reasonable degree of unity and consistency, even where the community of text linguists is still engaged in lively debate. We try to point out some major areas of dissension, but we will inevitably have overlooked or attenuated some individual claims and viewpoints. Such shortcomings may, we hope, be excused in a textbook on a new domain caught up in rapid evolution.  

robert-alain de beaugrande              wolfgang ulrich dressler

University of Florida                              University of Vienna

  Notes

1 In our new division of labour, topics emerging since 1972 were mostly treated by Prof. Beaugrande; Prof. Dresser’s contributions were largely in the areas he covered in the 1972 volume, especially cohesion.

2 E.g., Dascal & Margalit (1974).

3 E.g., Ballmer (1975).

4 For an impressive diversity of viewpoints, see papers in Petöfi (ed.) (1979), and surveys in Dressler (ed.) (1978).

5 The scientific status of text studies is explored in Beaugrande (1981b).

 

Chapter I

 Basic notions

     1. Here are six language samples that appear to be alike in some ways and different in others:1

[1] SLOW

 CHILDREN

 AT PLAY

[2] The King was in the counting house, counting all his money;

The Queen was in the parlour, eating bread and honey;

The Maid was in the garden, hanging out the clothes;

Along came a blackbird and pecked off her nose.

[3] Twenty-year-old Willie B.1s a diehard TV addict. He hates news and talk shows, but he loves football and gets so excited over food commercials that he sometimes charges at the set, waving a fist. Says a friend: “He’s like a little child.”

     Willie B.1s a 450-lb gorilla at the Atlanta Zoo. In December a Tennessee TV dealer heard about Willie B.’s lonely life as the zoo’s only gorilla and gave him a TV set.

[4] A great black and yellow V-2 rocket 46 feet long stood in a New Mexico desert. Empty it weighed five tons. For fuel it carried eight tons of alcohol and liquid oxygen.

    Everything was ready. Scientists and generals withdrew to some distance and crouched behind earth mounds. Two red flares rose as a signal to fire the rocket.

    With a great roar and burst of flame the giant rocket rose slowly and then faster and faster. Behind it trailed sixty feet of yellow flame. Soon the flame looked like a yellow star. In a few seconds it was too high to be seen, but radar tracked it as it sped upward to 3, 000 mph.

    A few minutes after it was fired, the pilot of a watching plane saw it return at a speed of 2, 400 mph and plunge into earth forty miles from the starting point.

[5] heffalump: (gloatingly): Ho-ho!

piglet (carelessly): Tra-la-la, tra-la-la.

heffalump (surprised, and not quite so sure of himself): Ho-ho!

piglet (more carelessly still): Tiddle-um-tum, tiddle-um-tum.

heffalump (beginning to say ‘Ho-ho’ and turning it awkwardly into a cough) H’r’m What’s all this?

piglet (surprised): Hallo! This is a trap I’ve made, and I’m waiting for the Heffalump to fall into it.

heffalump (greatly disappointed): Oh! (After a long silence): Are you sure?

piglet: Yes.

heffalump: Oh! (nervously): I—I thought it was a trap I’d made to catch piglets.

piglet (surprised): Oh. no!

heffalump: Oh! (apologetically): I—I must have got it wrong, then.

piglet: I’m afraid so. (politely): I’m sorry. (He goes on humming.)

heffalump: Well —Well—I— Well. I suppose I’d better be getting back?

piglet: (looking up carelessly): Must you? Well, if you see Christopher Robin anywhere, you might tell him I want him.

heffalump (eager to please): Certainly! Certainly! (He hurries off.)

 

           [6]  GHOSTS

Those houses haunt in which we leave

Something undone. It is not those

Great words or silences of love

That spread their echoes through a place

And fill the locked-up unbreathed gloom.

Ghosts do not haunt with any face

That we have known; they only come

With arrogance to thrust at us

Our own omissions in a room.

The words we would not speak they use,

The deeds we dared not act they flaunt,

Our nervous silences they bruise;

It is our helplessness they choose

And our refusals that they haunt.

2. These are all instances of English texts being used in discourse. The different ways these texts can be used indicates that they belong to different text types: [1] road sign, [2] nursery rhyme, [3] news article, [4] science textbook, [5] conversation between two participants taking turns, and [6] poem. It seems reasonable to require that a science of texts should be able to describe or explain both the shared features and the distinctions among these texts or text types. We ought to find out what standards texts must fulfil, how they might be produced or received, what people are using them for in a given setting of occurrence, and so forth. The words and sentences on the page are reliable clues, but they cannot be the total picture. The more pressing question is how the texts function in human interaction.

3. A text will be defined as a communicative occurrence which meets seven standards of textuality. If any of these standards is not considered to have been satisfied, the text will not be communicative. Hence, non-communicative texts are treated as non-texts (cf. III.8). We shall outline the seven standards informally in this chapter and then devote individual chapters to them later on.

4. The first standard will be called cohesion and concerns the ways in which the components of the surface text, i.e. the actual words we hear or see, 2 are mutually connected within a sequence. The surface components depend upon each other according to grammatical forms and conventions, such that cohesion rests upon grammatical dependencies. As linguists have often pointed out, surface sequences of English cannot be radically rearranged without causing disturbances. We would not, for instance, get very far by converting sample [1] into this order:

       [la] Children play slow at

and requesting the traffic authorities to use it on road signs. The series is so disjointed that drivers could hardly tell what goes with what. Obviously, the grammatical dependencies in the surface text are major signals for sorting out meanings and uses. All of the functions which can be used to signal relations among surface elements are included under our notion of cohesion.3

5. Notice that our original sample

[1] SLOW

    CHILDREN

 AT PLAY

might be divided up into various dependencies. Someone might conceivably construe it as a notice about ‘slow children’ who are ‘at play”, 4 so that unflattering conclusions could be drawn about the children’s intelligence or physical fitness. But the more likely reaction would be to divide the text into ‘slow’ and ‘children at play’, and suppose that drivers should reduce speed to avoid endangering the playing children. A science of texts should explain how ambiguities like this one are possible on the surface, but also how people preclude or resolve most ambiguities without difficulty. The surface is, as we see, not decisive by itself; there must be interaction between cohesion and the other standards of textuality to make communication efficient (cf. III.4).

6. The second standard will be called coherence and concerns the ways in which the components of the textual world, i.e., the configuration of concepts and relations which underlie the surface text, are mutually accessible and relevant.5 A concept is definable as a configuration of knowledge (cognitive content) which can be recovered or activated with more or less unity and consistency in the mind (cf. V.4ff.). relations are the links between concepts which appear together in a textual world: each link would bear a designation of the concept it connects to. For example, in ‘children at play’, ‘children’ is an object concept and ‘play’ an action concept, and the relation “agent-of” obtains, because the children are the agents of the action (cf. V.26(b)). Sometimes, though not always, the relations are not made explicit in the text, that is, they are not activated directly by expressions of the surface (cf. V.4). People will supply as many relations as are needed to make sense out of the text as it stands. In the road sign [1], ‘slow’ makes better sense as the “quantity of motion” which a text receiver should assume than as an attribute” of the children themselves.

7. Coherence can be illustrated particularly well by a group of relations subsumed under causality.6 These relations concern the ways in which one situation or event affects the conditions for some other one. In a sample such as:

   [7] Jack fell down and broke his crown.

the event of ‘falling down’ is the cause of the event of ‘breaking’, since it created the necessary conditions for the latter. A weaker type of causality applies to this sample:

[8] The Queen of Hearts, she made some tarts,

      All on a summer’s day.

     The Knave of Hearts, he stole those tarts,

     And took them quite away.

Here, the Queen’s action created the sufficient, but not necessary conditions for the Knave’s action (made it possible, but not obligatory); this relation can be termed enablement.

8. These conceptual relations do not cover all kinds of causality. In a sample such as:

   [9] Jack shall have but a penny a day

   Because he can’t work any faster

the low pay is not actually caused or enabled by the slow working, but is nonetheless a reasonable and predictable outcome. The term reason can be used for the relation where an action follows as a rational response to some previous event. In contrast, Jack’s ‘breaking his crown’ was independently necessary (we could not ask: “What made him feel like doing that?”) (cf. Wilks 1977b: 235f.)

9. Cause, enablement, and reason cannot capture the relation at stake here:

     [10] Old Mother Hubbard went to the cupboard to get her poor dog a bone.

Mother Hubbard’s first action does enable the second, but there is an important difference between samples [8] and [10]l: the agent’s plan is involved in [10], while the Queen did not do her baking for the sake of allowing a theft. The term purpose can be used for an event or situation which is planned to become possible via a previous event or situation.

 10. Another way of looking at events or situations is their arrangement in time. Cause, enablement, and reason have forward directionality, that is, the earlier event or situation causes, enables, or provides the reason for the later one. Purpose has backward directionality, that is, the later event or situation is the purpose for the earlier one. Time relations can

be very intricate, depending on the organization of the particular events or situations mentioned. Where sample [10] goes on to say:

      [11] When she got there, the cupboard was bare.

our knowledge of the world tells us that the ‘getting there’ action was later than that of ‘going to the cupboard’ (being the terminal boundary of the latter), but happened at the same time as the situation of the ‘cupboard being bare’. The relation of temporal proximity can be specified in many ways, according to the boundaries of events.7

 11. We reserve the discussion of other coherence relations for section V. 25ff. We would only point out here that we have already moved somewhat beyond the text as it is actually made manifest in sound or print. Coherence is clearly not a mere feature of texts, but rather the outcome of cognitive processes among text users. The simple juxtaposition of events and situations in a text will activate operations which recover or create coherence relations. We can notice that effect in this sample:

[12] The King was in the counting house, counting all his money;

       The Queen was in the parlour, eating bread and honey;

          The Maid was in the garden, hanging out the clothes;

In the explicit text, there is a set of actions (‘counting’, ‘eating’, ‘hanging out’); the only relations presented are the location, the agent, and the affected entity of each action (on these terms, cf. V.26ff.). Yet simply by virtue of the textual configuration, a text receiver is likely to assume that the action is in each case the purpose of being at that location; that the locations are proximate to each other, probably in or near the royal palace; and even that the actions are proximate in time. One might well go on to assume that the actions are intended to signal the attributes of the agents (e.g. the King being avaricious, the Queen gluttonous, the Maid industrious). The adding of one’s own knowledge to bring a textual world together is called inferencing (cf. V. 32ff.)

 12. Coherence already illustrates the nature of a science of texts as human activities. A text does not make sense by itself, but rather by the interaction of text-presented knowledge with people’s stored knowledge of the world (cf. Petöfi 1974; IX.24-40). It follows that text linguists must cooperate with cognitive psychologists to explore even such a basic matter as the “sense” of a text. We also see that theories and methods will have to be probabilistic rather than deterministic, that is, they will state what is usually the case rather than always. Different users might set up slightly different senses; yet there will be a common core of probable operations and content consistently found among most users, so that the notion “sense of a text” is not unduly unstable (cf. V.1).

 13. Cohesion and coherence are text-centred notions, designating operations directed at the text materials. In addition, we shall require user-centred notions which are brought to bear on the activity of textual communication at large, both by producers and by receivers. The third standard of textuality could then be called intentionality, concerning the text producer’s attitude that the set of occurrences should constitute a cohesive and coherent text instrumental in fulfilling the producer’s intentions, e.g. to distribute knowledge or to attain a goal specified in a plan.9 To some degree, cohesion and coherence could themselves be regarded as operational goals without whose attainment other discourse goals may be blocked. However, text users normally exercise tolerance towards products whose conditions of occurrence make it hard to uphold cohesion and coherence altogether (cf. VI.2ff.), notably in casual conversation. A hybrid structure such as this (documented in Coulthard 1977: 72):

     [12] Well where do which part of town do you live?

did not disturb communication because it still served the superior goal of finding out someone’s address, although the subordinate goal of maintaining cohesion did not fully succeed. But if a text producer intended to defy cohesion and coherence, communication would be slowed down for negotiation (cf. IX.1s ff.) and could break down altogether.

 14. The fourth standard of textuality would be acceptability, concerning the text receiver’s attitude that the set of occurrences should constitute a cohesive and coherent text having some use or relevance for the receiver, e.g. to acquire knowledge or provide co-operation in a plan.10 This attitude is responsive to such factors as text type, social or cultural setting, and the desirability of goals. Here also, we could view the maintenance of cohesion and coherence by the text receiver as a goal of its own, such that material would be supplied or disturbances tolerated as required. The operation of inferencing, mentioned in I.11 strikingly illustrates how receivers support coherence by making their own contributions to the sense of the text.

 15. If acceptability is restricted, communication can be diverted. It is accordingly taken as a signal of non-cooperation if a text receiver raises questions about acceptability when the text producer’s intentionality is obviously in effect (Dickens 1836-37: 774):11

[13] “What we require, sir, is a probe of this here.” “Probate, my dear sir, probate, “ said Pell. “Well, sir, “ replied Mr. Weller sharply, “probe and probe it is very much the same; if you don’t understand what I mean, sir, I daresay I can find them as does.” “No offence, I hope, Mr. Weller, “ said Pell meekly.

 16. Text producers often speculate on the receivers’ attitude of acceptability and present texts that require important contributions in order to make sense. The Bell Telephone Company warns people:

[14] Call us before you dig. You may not be able to afterwards.

 People are left to infer that digging without asking might lead to cutting off a ground cable and hence to losing the wiring needed in order to call; or even, to sustaining bodily injury and being incapacitated. It is intriguing that [14] is more effective than a version would be that made everything more explicit (in the sense of 1.6), such as:

[14]a Call us before you dig. There might be an underground cable. If you break the cable, you won’t have phone service, and you may get a severe electric shock. Then you won’t be able to call us.

Apparently, text receivers are readily persuaded by content they must supply on their own: it is as if they were making the assertion themselves (cf. VII-28, 42; VIII.20). Sample [14] is more informative than sample [14a], a factor which constitutes the next standard of textuality.

    17. The fifth standard of textuality is called informativity and concerns the extent to which the occurrences of the presented text are expected vs. unexpected or known vs. unknown/certain.12 In sample [14], the assertion that ‘you will not ‘be able to call’ is much more unexpected than it is in [14]a. The processing of highly informative occurrences is more demanding than otherwise, but correspondingly more interesting as well. Caution must be exercised lest the receivers’ processing become overloaded to the point of endangering communication.

 18. Every text is at least somewhat informative: no matter how predictable form and content may be, there will always be a few variable occurrences that cannot be entirely foreseen. Particularly low informativity is likely to be disturbing, causing boredom or even rejection of the text. The opening stretch of a science textbook runs like this:13

[15] The sea is water

The fact asserted here is so well known to everyone that there seems to be no point in saying it here. The stretch of text is clearly cohesive and coherent, and undoubtedly intended to be acceptable as such. But it is nonetheless a marginal text because it is so uninformative. Not until we look at the continuation does the text’s status seem more sound:

[15a] The sea is water only in the sense that water is the dominant substance present. Actually, it is a solution of gases and salts in addition to vast numbers of living organisms ...

The assertion of the obvious fact in [15] functions as a starting point for asserting something more informative. The surface cue ‘actually’ signals that the well-known “substance-of” relation (cf. V.26(1)) is not strictly accurate. The ensuing correction of a common view is less expected, so that the informativity of the whole passage is upgraded (cf. VII.16).

19. The sixth standard of textuality can be designated situationality and concerns the factors which make a text relevant to a situation of occurrence.14 We saw in I.5 that one might treat the road sign

[1]    SLOW

      CHILDREN

       AT PLAY

in different ways, but that the most probable intended use was obvious. The ease with which people can decide such an issue is due to the influence of the situation where the text is presented. In the case of sample [1], the sign is placed in a location where a certain class of receivers, namely motorists, are likely to be asked for a particular action. It is far more reasonable to assume that ‘slow’ is a request to reduce speed rather than an announcement of the children’s mental or physical deficiencies. Pedestrians can tell that the text is not relevant for themselves because their speeds would not endanger anyone. In this manner, the sense and use of the text are decided via the situation.

 20. Situationality even affects the means of cohesion. On the one hand, a text version such as:

[1b] Motorists should proceed slowly, because children are playing in the vicinity and might run out into the street. Vehicles can stop more readily if they are moving slowly.

would remove every possible doubt about sense, use, and group of intended receivers. On the other hand, it would not be appropriate to a situation where receivers have only limited time and attention to devote to signs among the other occurrences of moving traffic. That consideration forces the text producer toward a maximum of economy; situationality works so strongly that the minimal version [1] is more appropriate than the clearer [1b] (cf. I.23).

21. The seventh standard of textuality is to be called intertextuality and concerns the factors which make the utilization of one text dependent upon knowledge of one or more previously encountered texts. A driver who has seen road sign [1] is likely to see another sign further down the road, such as:

[16] RESUME SPEED

One cannot ‘resume’ something unless one was doing it at an earlier time and then stopped it for some reason. The ‘speed’ at stake here can only be the one maintained until [1] was encountered and a reduction was made. Clearly, the sense and relevance of [16] depends upon knowing about [1] and applying the content to the evolving situation.

 22. Intertextuality is, in a general fashion, responsible for the evolution of text types as classes of texts with typical patterns of characteristics (cf. IX.1ff.). Within a particular type, reliance on intertextuality may be more or less prominent. In types like parodies, critical reviews, rebuttals, or reports, the text producer must consult the prior text continually, and text receivers will usually need some familiarity with the latter. An advertisement appeared in magazines some years ago showing a petulant young man saying to someone outside the picture:

[17] As long as you’re up, get me a Grant’s.

A professor working on a research project cut the text out of a magazine, altered it slightly, and displayed it on his office door as:

[17a] As long as you’re up, get me a Grant.

In the original setting, [ 17] was a request to be given a beverage of a particular brand. In the new setting, [17a] seems to be pointless: research grants are awarded only after extensive preparation and certainly can’t be gotten while casually walking across a room. The discrepancy is resolvable via one’s knowledge of the originally presented text and its intention, while the unexpectedness of the new version renders it informative and interesting (cf. I.17). This interest effect offsets the lack of immediate situational relevance and the nonserious intention of the new text presenter.

23. We have now glanced at all seven standards of textuality: cohesion (1.4-5), coherence (1.6-12), intentionality (I.13), acceptability (I.14-16), informativity (I.17-18), situationality (I.19-20), and intertextuality (I.22-22). These standards function as constitutive principles (after Searle 1969: 33f.) of textual communication: they define and create the form of behaviour identifiable as textual communicating, and if they are defied, that form of behaviour will break down. There must also exist regulative principles (again following Searle) that control textual communication rather than define it. We envision at least three regulative principles. The efficiency of a text depends on its use in communicating with a minimum expenditure of effort by the participants. The effectiveness of a text depends on its leaving a strong impression and creating favourable conditions for attaining a goal. The appropriateness of a text is the agreement between its setting and the ways in which the standards of textuality are upheld. 16

24. It will be our task in this book to pursue both the constitutive and the regulative principles of textual communication. We shall present some topics loosely grouped under each of the seven standards in turn. At the same time, we shall be concerned with illustrating how the constitution and use of texts are controlled by the principles of efficiency, effectiveness, and appropriateness. Not surprisingly, our discussion will lead us into some domains outside the confines of usual linguistics, simply because of the different concerns we raise. In particular, we shall be obliged to rely on considerable research in other disciplines, notably cognitive science, a new field at the crossroads of linguistics, psychology, and computer science (cf. X.3 and, on artificial intelligence, X. 26ff.). The standards of textuality alone entail, as we have seen, factors of cognition, planning, and social environment merely to distinguish what constitutes a text. Still, it is perhaps not unduly optimistic to hope that the broad outlines we shall undertake to sketch are gradually being filled in by the concerted interaction of researchers sharing a commitment to the study of language use as a crucial human activity.

 

Notes

1 Samples [1] and [2] are public domain. Sample [3] is taken from TIME magazine, 22 Jan. 1979. Sample [4] is a selection from Booklet D of McCall & Crabbs (1961); after being used in diverse studies (see note 10 to Chapter V), it formed the basis for a specifically text-linguistic inquiry (see Beaugrande 1980a, 1980c, 1981b). Simmons and Chester (1979) was in turn inspired by the latter’s studies. Sample [5] is taken from A. A. Milne’s House at Pooh Corner (1928: 44f.) Sample [6] is from Elisabeth Jennings’ Poems 1967 (1967:55). I 1.4-6 and 19-21; [2] in I.11; [3] in VII.21-28 and 42; [4] in III.26, IV.7-10, 24, 29, V.29-39, and IX.25-39; [5] in VI.29-31; and [6] in VII.29-4.2.

2 The “surface” is not of course the raw material of sounds or printed marks; it already presupposes that language expressions are presented and identified. How this identification is actually done is of course a valid issue for the procedural approach, even though we cannot treat it here. See Selfridge & Neisser (1960); Sperling (1960); Neisser (1967); Crowder & Morton (1969); Woods et al. (1976); Rumelhart (1977a); and Walker (ed.) (1978).

3 The term “cohesion” was made current by Halliday and later by Hasan (cf. Halliday 1964; Hasan 1968; Halliday & Hasan 1976). Compare

also Crymes (1968); Harweg (1968); Palek (1968); Hobbs (1976); Webber (1978). Note that our use of the term is extremely broad, including all means of signalling surface dependencies (cf. Halliday 1964: 303).

4 We enclose linguistic samples in single quotes, excluding all punctuation not part of the sample. We use double quotes with conventional punctuation for all other purposes.

5 On coherence, see Harweg (1968); Karttunen (1968); Bellert (1970); van Dijk (1972a, 1977a); Kintsch (1974); Beaugrande (1980a). “Coherence” has often been confused or conflated with “cohesion”; but the distinction between connectivity of the surface and connectivity of underlying content is indispensable (cf. Widdowson 1973; Coulthard 1977; Beaugrande, 1980a).

6 For different but largely compatible discussions of causality, cf. Schank (1975); Wilks (1977b). We mention some typical “junctives” that signal causality later on (IV.46). 7 Some “junctives” for temporal proximity are given in IV.47. On event boundaries, cf. III.24.

8 In V.1, we distinguish between “meaning” as the potential of language expressions (or other signs) for being significant, and “sense” as the knowledge actually conveyed by expressions in occurring texts.

9 “Intentionality” has been much discussed under various conditions, but with inconclusive results. For more directly applicable work, see Wunderlich (197i); Hörmann (1976); Bruce (1977); van Dijk (1977a); Schlesinger (1977); Cohen (1978); McCalla (1978); Wilensky (1978a); Allen (1979); Beaugrande (1979a, 1979b, 1980a) (compare also VI.6). Note that the producer of the text is not always identical with the presenter, e.g.1n the case of text allusion (IX.12); this factor falls under the notion of intertextuality (cf. 1.22 on parody).

10 On acceptability, see Quirk & Svartvik (1966); Greenbaum (ed.) (1977). On acceptance of other participants’ discourse goals, see Cohen (1978); McCalla (1978)., Allen (1979).

11 This excerpt from The Pickwick Papers (Dickens 1836-37: 774) is slightly altered to make dialect features less difficult for non-native readers of English. We adopt the compromise policy throughout of keeping the words, but normalizing idiosyncratic spellings that might be unclear.

12 On informativity, see Shannon (1951); Weltner (1964); Grimes (1975); Loftus & Loftus (1976); Groeben (1978); Beaugrande (1978b, 1986a). Our use of the term is broader and less formal than in early work (cf. Chapter VII).

13 This excerpt is the first passage of Chanslor (1967: 9). For a full discussion, see Beaugrande (1978b).

14 Situationality has been treated less in linguistics proper than in sociolinguistics and ethnomethodology; consult the papers in Gumperz & Hymes (eds.) (1972); Bauman & Scherzer (eds.) (1974). A survey of sociolinguistics overall is given in Dittmar (1976).

15 A narrower use of “intertextuality” is found in Kristeva (1968); for an outlook closer to ours, consult Quirk (1978).

16 We appeal to these notions below in 11.6, III.9, IV.11, 28, 37, VII.28, VIII.11, IX.11, and X.16

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