Chapter V, Part 2

V.B. Text types and discourse domains

41. Understandably, the concept of text type (compare German ‘Texttyp’, ‘Textsorte’, ‘Textklasse’) attracted slight interest in a °mainstream linguistics pragmatically devoted to describing language by itself° apart from its uses. This disinterest even carried over into early text linguistics in its project to construct a ‘formal grammar’ for the ‘text’ abstractly viewed as a well-formed sequence of sentences (cf. II.85, 105). Only when such a general ‘grammar’ signally failed to attain °coverage, convergence, and consensus° did research widely lower its sights to describing text types and the discourse domains they serve where we can hope to uncover °richer constraints°.

42. The °functional lexicogrammar° proposed in IV.B might help out by indicating some strategic dominances of Processes and Aspects for specified text types. In the discourse domain of political history, for example, the ‘political’ factor would favor °control centers° being Participants with disparate degrees of power plus their Actions, chiefly Enactive and Dispositive (how they acted and what or whom they acted upon), while the ‘historical’ factor would favor rich Circumstances of Temporality and Locality. Less central but still influential would be Semiotic Actions, e.g., declarations, decrees, and other acts intended to project a Message. Sample [564] would be one typical Discourse Episode; and we might make tables for the Processes like [564a] and for the Aspects like [564b].

[564] In June 1906 the peasants of Dinshaway clashed with British soldiers who were hunting pigeons, and a soldier who went for help died of exhaustion. The British wanted to set an example and convened a special tribunal. They hanged four peasants, flogged four, and imprisoned twelve. Egyptian nationalism took on a more strident tone. (The Making of Modern Egypt, 19)

[564a] Dispositives: clashed, hunting, hanged, flogged, imprisoned

Enactive: went for help

Developmental: died, exhaustion, took on a more strident tone

Volitional: wanted, nationalism [= wanting independence]

Semiotic: set an example, convened

Circumstances: In June 1906, Dinshaway, Egyptian

Participants: peasants, British soldiers, pigeons, soldier, the British, tribunal, peasants

[564b] Unmarked: Positive, Past, Declarative, Narrative

Tentatives: hunting, went for

Frequentive and Intensive: hanged, flogged, imprisoned

Textual commentary can readily build upon and enrich such a table. The side of power, in this case ‘the British’, may expressly intend its Dispositives to be Semiotics (e.g., ‘hanging’ to ‘set an example’). In a historical and political perspective, Actions of violence, though °regressive and ecologically unsound°, are always meaningful, as when the soldier’s death was perversely interpreted as a communal murder rather than a natural effect of the rough, hot terrain on a lad from chilly old England. And at a deeper level, the Egyptians may have read the foray of ‘soldiers’ to ‘hunt pigeons’ (one of their own staple foods) as a provocation; certainly, colonial powers have often provoked ‘incidents’ to get a pretext for intervening and seizing territory, though in this case the British had already drummed up a pretext for seizing Egypt and especially the Suez Canal in 1882. Still, the step from a violent Dispositive over to a Semiotic is hard to control: this ‘example’ was read as a Message not that ‘nationalist’ resistance was futile but that it was, on the contrary, much more urgent.

43. The discourse domain of environmentalism also centers on Dispositives (disposing over resources), Production (manufacturing that exploits resources and creates dangerous wastes) and Circumstances (places representing the environment). But the focus goes to ecological effects beyond just the human Participants, namely the effects on the total ambience for all forms of life. And whereas political history has had its own discourse domain for a very long time, environmentalism did not develop one until many people had admitted that °modernization was imposing a host of ecologically unsound practices°, especially the voracious depletion of non-renewable resources (I.2, 9; III.104; VII.7). Before the °New Right coalition° openly proclaimed its noble ideology of universal selfishness and greed (cf. VII.32ff), the discourse was nearly all on one side, with everyone, including the worst despoilers and polluters, claiming to favor the environment. Hence, the dominant Processes were Perceptive and Cognitive — what the inhabitants of the environment detect or know about the Disposing, in contrast to what is officially claimed. The contrast has been widening during the conflict between ecological concern versus feverish campaigns for °economic growth in the midst of a global recession° caused by just such campaigns. Environmental depletion and damage are not halted, let alone reversed, but merely mystified and concealed. A typical Discourse Episode is a discovery whose cast of Participants includes the rich and empowered ‘depleters’, the poor and disempowered ‘depleted’, and the discoverer(s) — here, the African environmentalist and information disseminator Seun Ogunseitan (cf. V.88), plus the Circumstances of Locality [565]. We could have a table of dominant Processes like [565a] and of Aspects like [565b].

[565] After six months’ investigation of the trade in toxic waste in Europe and Nigeria, Ogunseitan […] discovered that at least twenty extremely poisonous chemicals from a number of European firms had been dumped in Koko, a quiet town in the swampy delta of the Niger river […] Thousands of drums, bags, and containers, many of them broken, were found in an unguarded compound surrounded only by a ten-foot high rickety fence. Less than fifty metres away people were living quietly, cropping cassava. (Ogunseitan et al.) (An African Dream)

[565a] Dispositive: trade in toxic waste, dumped, broken

Perceptive + Cognitive: investigation, discovered, were found

Productive: from a number of European firms, cropping

Participants: Ogunseitan, firms, chemicals, drums, bags, containers, people

Circumstances: After six months, in Europe and Nigeria, in Koko, in the swampy delta of the Niger river, in a compound, Less than fifty metres away

[565b] Unmarked: Positive, Past, Declarative, Narrative => Descriptive

Progressive + Durative: were living quietly, cropping cassava

Besides the explicit Dispositives, we can infer implicit ones: ‘extremely poisonous’ for what the waste could do to people, and ‘unguarded’ for what people should have done with it but hadn’t (to save money and to avoid drawing attention, combining profit with secrecy). The ironic contrast of lethal danger and peaceful setting culminates in the ‘cassava’ plant, whose roots are eaten — the part most vulnerable to ‘chemicals’. Environmentalist pressure in the wealthy Center countries is evidently being met by secretly transferring lethal wastes to poor countries at the Periphery, on the hateful colonialist pretexts that ‘life is cheap’ there anyway (thanks to no birth control) and medical diagnosis is too primitive to link such a dump with mysterious diseases or deaths among the cassava farmers.

44. The domain of linguistic discourse, in contrast, is, like ‘scientific text types’ in general, less Narrative and more Expository and Descriptive, but with the further constraint that Semiotic and Cognitive processes dominate, as in the typical Discourse Episode [566] by Wallace Chafe, with the tables of Processes [566a] and Aspects [566b].

[566] Some Indian languages express subtleties which English glosses over. When I say ‘he is chopping wood’, I give no hint how I came to know this. In the Wintu language of northern California, I would say ‘pi k’upabe’ if I had seen the woodsman at work. If I had heard but not seen him, I would say ‘pi k’upanthe’. If someone had told me about it, the form would be ‘pi k’upake’ — ‘I understand that he is chopping wood’. Or if I guess the act is going on because he usually does it at this time, I would say ‘pi k’upanthe’ — ‘I assume he is chopping wood’ (A Richness of Words) after Kluckhohn

[566a] Semiotics: express subtleties, say (4 times), told about it; with Negative: glosses over, give no hint

Cognitive: know, understand, guess, assume

Perceptive: seen, heard

Dispositive: is chopping wood (3 times), at work; as Developmental: going on; as Enactive: does it

Participants: languages, English, I, woodsman/he, someone; subtleties, hint, form, act

Circumstances: at this time, northern California; Semiotic as Circumstance: In the Wintu language

[566b] Unmarked: Positive, Present, Declarative, Expository

Progressive: is chopping wood (2 times)

Completive: came to know

Conditional: would say (3 times), had seen, had heard but not seen, had told, would be, if I guess

Frequentive: usually

Tentative: guess, assume

The °interaction of linguistic, cognitive, and social constraints° is prominently topicalized here. Semiotics thematically interact with Perceptives and Cognitives to connect what you ‘say’ with social moves for ‘coming to know’ it, which in Wintu has precise effects on grammatical form. The connection is foregrounded by the Conditional Status: ‘if’ you ‘know’ (or ‘see’, ‘assume’, etc.) in a given manner, then ‘say’. Typical too is having a ‘language’ or its ‘forms’ or content (e.g. ‘hint’) be Participants in place of the speakers who ‘express’, ‘gloss over’, and so on (cf. IV.24;VII.260). By adopting the role of a first-person speaker of Wintu, Chafe smartly streamlines the translating into English and distinguishes himself from the third-person ‘chopping’ Agent or any ‘someone’ who might intervene. The obtrusive Dispositive (‘chopping wood’) is a classical and objective Action free of subjective problems about how you know it (versus, say ‘he is making plans’ or ‘he is being unfriendly’).

45. Although these functional descriptions can support lexicogrammatical portrayals of a text type or discourse domain, they certainly don’t yield the strict definitions or delimitations for the comprehensive, theoretically rigorous classification some linguists have demanded. Those demands reflect the long-standing ambition among linguists to classify things into a complete repertory with a limited number of clear-cut criteria stated in terms of °language by itself°, which has succeeded in the °sparser subdomains like phonology but not in the richer ones like semantics and pragmatics° (cf. II.28-50; V.1). For text types, the perplexities are still more recalcitrant because the types are themselves intermediary control systems that guide the choices of options but do not prescribe specific ‘rules’ or ‘bundles of features’. Each type rides on its own °dialectic between specifying versus manifesting constraints° that are richer than for the language as a whole (V.3). How can the dynamic dialectic be °frozen for purposes of formal description°?

   46. So we can readily appreciate why early research on text types loosened rather than enhanced control over the domain of study while fresh perplexities emerged: how many types to postulate, how to label them, which properties identify a given type, and so on. °Classicalizing approaches that tabulated Parts of Speech° and the like proved ineffectual. In retrospect, the central problem seems plain: trying to jump from very sparse data (say, choices of Verb Tenses) over to very rich concepts (say, literary novel) (cf. V.16.3). Instead, we need functional models indicating how the °sparser data act as the means for the ends of richer data across the layered hierarchy of language°. We can build upon the layer-model proposed in Fig. III.27 back in III.92 to get the model shown below in Fig. V.2. The text type is now described as coupling the material base (the means) for text

 patterns  with the data field (the end) for schematizing meanings to support the processing of topics, e.g., to explain the capacities of human memory in psychological monographs. Above that, a discourse domain couples the material base (the means) for interaction patterns  with the data field (the end) of negotiating meanings  to support the processing of scripts that organize roles and the co-ordination of the participants’ plans and goals, e.g., for holding a lecture on ‘human intelligence’ in support of a new school curriculum. Again, the layering is spanned by the three functional levels on the left of the figure going from harder to softer, namely, prosody, lexicogrammar, and discourse, whereby the couplings can interface the threefold °constraints of language, world, and society° (cf. II.48, 62f; III.92). In this model, sparser data (say, word choices) relate to a text type or discourse domain largely through the mediation of richer layers (say, topics). So the language data in a discourse sample offer evidence whose significance is to be established by mapping out the mediation, e.g., by showing in detail how the avoidance of First Person Singular or of Emotive Processes in psychological monographs (III.100) is part of the general script for speaking in the name of a faceless, impersonal institution of authority about mental processes that are hard to observe.

    47. Recent criticism of the term or concept of ‘text type’ for being pre-theoretical indicates that the mediation between the sparse data usually presented in ‘theoretical linguistics’ and the rich data of discourse domains is still poorly mapped out. It might be fairer to criticize mainstream ‘linguistic theories’ for being pre-practical — not yet adequately relatable to discoursal practices. The study of text types illustrate how °scientific validity can get traded off against ecological validity° (III.257). A classification in terms of the statistical frequency of Word Classes could claim to be quite precise and objective but would contribute very little to an °ecologist program for free access to knowledge and society through discourse°. Instead, we might reset our priorities by starting from ecological validity and developing it as the cognitive and social context for scientific validity, as in as in Gell-Mann’s book The Quark and the Jaguar, which is a deliberate and integratively complex mix of text types: scientific treatise, ecologist program, philosophical disquisition, epistemological analysis, and personal history. In such a text, a given feature is especially likely to be °multi-functional°, e.g., his use of the First Person Singular to counteract the image of science as a faceless, impersonal institution and at the same time to show how his personal convictions about sustainable ecology and his personal hobby as an observer of wildlife have helped to guide his famous search for a unified theory in physics.

   48. Perhaps we could step back from the standard question of which or how many text types there are, to pose the question of which criteria could distinguish them for a given text in a corpus, such as:

(a) the graphic format of the text, e.g., the alphabetical columns in a ‘telephone directory’;

(b) the style of the text, e.g., the archaic lexicogrammar of English ‘psalms’ and ‘prayers’;

(c) the topic to be expressed, e.g., the deceased person’s accomplishments and virtues for the ‘eulogy’ at a funeral;

(d) the dominant Processes or Aspects, e.g., Intensive Dispositives in a ‘war report’;

(e) the participants who are likely or entitled to produce the text, e.g., the drill instructor who barks out the ‘orders’ in the U.S. Marine Corps;

(f) the plan and goal, e.g., seeking a buyer for your ‘used automobile’ (or ‘pre-owned vehicle’) through a ‘classified ad’;

(g) the situation in which the type occurs, e.g., a job interview calling for a ‘resumé’;

(h) the informativity suitable to the participants, e.g., a ‘training lecture’ for electronics technicians to operate and service a new machine;

(i) the institution that codifies the type and defines the participants, e.g., a criminal court where you enter a ‘plea’;

(j) the medium of presentation, e.g., a telephone answering machine to present a recorded ‘greeting’ and to request a ‘message’ after a ‘beep’.

Such criteria cannot be rigorous or complete because they apply selectively and in various combinations during discoursal practices. For example, the message on a telephone answering machine normally stems from a certain participant (an occupant of the premises), has a typical style (e.g., matter-of-fact), topic (the answering person not being available but willing to call back later), dominant Processes (Identifying and Semiotic) and Aspects (Imperative ‘leave number’ plus stated or implied Performative promise to ‘return your call’), a plan (be available for contact when you’re away), a low ratio of informativity (inform callers who they’ve reached), and perhaps a specific situationality (e.g., you’re being harassed by abusive callers, I.50). Such interactions accommodate the diverse functions and roles in discourse, but vastly compound the difficulty of classifying text types in a rigorous scheme. Here too, rich knowledge of world and society is easy to apply in practice but hard to capture in theory (cf. I.34-37, 41, 55, 58f; II.67, 75; III.1, 86f; IV.157).

49. In the meantime, we can concentrate on readily identifiable types with demonstrable social relevance to human goals. Such types sustain discourse domains that can have a major personal or social impact on participants, depending on their discoursal skills. Some domains provide extensively scripted roles for the participants. You cannot simply fail or refuse to play the role, and the tolerance for inappropriate  discourse may be narrow and risky. In the domain of ‘legal proceedings’, for example, the discourse role of ‘defendant’ is tightly scripted irrespective of the ‘facts’ of the case, e.g., whether you are ‘guilty’. Fieldwork by Ruth Wodak found that Viennese defendants involved in traffic accidents with a fatal outcome consistently received lighter sentences when they played the role with efficien t and appropriate  discourse. A fluent Narrative of the accident in a ‘standard’ dialect was far more likely to elicit belief and a mild sentence from the judge than was a hesitant, disorganized one in a ‘non-standard’ dialect (of which Vienna has a copious supply), even though all the victims were equally dead.

50. Social relevance to goals has the advantage of being a criterion open to reliable judgement by the participants themselves and not just postulated by theoreticians. For the commonplace text type ‘posted notices’, the ‘posting’ person anticipates a group of otherwise unspecified receivers for whom the message will be relevant. So the notice should be terse and plain and posted in a location where this group is likely to read it. Someone without the relevant cultural knowledge of goals might be puzzled by notices like [567-69], which I observed in north Florida on a rural fencepost, at a hairdresser’s, and at a petrol station, and like [570] in the bus station in Baguio (Philippines).

[567] CLEAN diRT — DOZER WORK

[568] Walk-Ins Welcome

[569] Drive-offs Will Be Prosecuted

[570] This Platform is Off Limits to Pickpockets and Baggage Thieves

For [567], the prospective paradoxes of ‘dirt’ having the Attribute ‘clean’ and of people doing the Enactives of both ‘dozing’ and ‘working’ are irrelevant for the goals of local farmers, who need dirt free of garbage or chemicals, and bulldozers to move it. For the Enactives in [568-69], the prototypical pattern of ‘drive-ins’ giving prompt service to Americans who stay in their cars has yielded ‘walk-ins’ for people coming in without a prior appointment, and ‘drive-offs’ for people who fill up on petrol and leave without paying. Since all customers must ‘walk in’ and ‘drive off’, the goal of these texts must be to provide a more specific promise or threat. The goal for the Impermissible Circumstance in [570] is more mediated, since the Agents it names would ignore it even if they read it; the goal is probably to reassure passengers while warning them to be watchful.

51. Quite different goals are relevant for the text-type ‘weather report’. This type is tightly constrained in its format as well as in its topic, situation, and medium, and is thus usually low in informativity. The script foresees an economy centered on Evaluating the Ameriorative ‘good’ or Pejorative ‘bad’ weather conditions relevant for people who want to plan activities, e.g.:

[580] Southern Europe will be warm Friday into the weekend. A few thunderstorms are possible by Sunday. Heavy rain will fall in Northern Spain this weekend. Northern Europe, including Paris and London, will be unsettled with clouds and showers. […] A storm will pass from eastern China across South Korea and into Japan over the weekend, bringing soaking rains to many areas.

The ‘bad’ Values are foregrounded by analogizing weather conditions into Agents who can do Dispositives on people and places by ‘unsettling’ and ‘soaking’ them. These Values are more relevant for fisherman in small crafts on the Sea of Japan or campers in the Pyrenees than for farmers hoping for rain, or surfers who dig stormy waves. Extremely bad conditions such as a hurricane are likely to spill over into other text types, such as a ‘disaster report’ plus photos on the front page, and analogizing with Agents may lead to giving the hurricane a human’s name.

52. The text-type (or cluster of types) ‘printed advertisement’ is directly relevant to the advertiser’s goal of getting the readers to put purchase and consumption on their agenda. The challenge is making your message seem relevant to the readers who are literally flooded by such messages (I.13). It may well not be effective to simply command people to run out and buy your commodity. Instead, you can command them to do something enjoyable such as ‘learning how to open up exciting conversations with strange girls’ or ‘becoming a skilled writer in just six weeks’ ([107] and [216] in IV.52, 90), where your commodity is supposed to provide the means. Or, you can count on people knowing what they’ll do, e.g., if you present your ‘escort service’ by saying ‘top class young ladies, nice dressed and speak all languages, offer you first class company’, or ‘we guarantee that our girls are all attractive, open-minded, personal, with a sense of humour’, or ‘superintelligent funny ladies’ where the Danish writer probably thought that English ‘funny’ means ‘providing fun’ (Copenhagen This Week, June 1993). Or again, you can invite imaginative inferences about what will happen, e.g., during sociable activities [581-82]. Again, the commodities are presented as the means toward an interactive goal, e.g., using liquor to make friends get ‘close’ and into just the ‘right mood’ for…well, ‘anything’.

[581] When the friends are close and the mood is right, the party starts in the kitchen. And, of course, –––Vodka is there. PT April 1984, 47

[582] Anything can happen. [picture of a huge tequila bottle behind a group of two [!] males and three {!] females on a beach, all gorgeous]

As usual, the °scenario of consumerist discourse invokes a reconciliation fantasy (I.12) for social alienation°, wherein the °commodity offers easy gratifications° that are otherwise denied. The degree of explicitness can range from direct appeal [583] to reassurance [584] to mere hint [585]. In these scenarios, the reader is the Participant who gets something for nothing: a prize, a chance to gorge without getting fat, and a payment of damages from a negligence lawsuit. The enticement helps to mystify the specious premises so symptomatic of consumerism, e.g., that ‘a million prizes’ could be ‘instantly’ disbursed (apparently all to you), that frozen yoghurt has zero calories (it has half as many as ice cream), and that every ‘accident’ is somebody else’s fault. Demystified versions would be ineffectiv e in openly appealing to greed and gluttony and debunking the ease and innocence of the gratification fantasy [583a-85a] (cf. IV.250).

[583] WIN INSTANTLY OVER 1,000,000 PRIZES! [magazine sweepstakes]

[584] ALL THE PLEASURE — NONE OF THE GUILT [frozen yoghurt outlet]

[585] Accidents don’t just happen. They are caused by people. Sometimes saying you’re sorry isn’t enough. [attorneys’ firm]

[583a] Enter our sweepstakes immediately and qualify to win one of over 1,000,000 prizes in the near future.

[584a] With frozen yoghurt you can have the same pleasure as gorging on ice cream but you need feel only half as guilty afterwards.

[585a] Let us find some rich guy to blame for your accident and sue for a pile of cash.

Evidently, text receivers can be more easily persuaded by content they infer, especially if their Participant role in the scenario is one they would not want to have spelled out (cf. I.32; IV.240).

53. An ordinary citizen formulating a classified ad has more direct goals and follows tighter constraints upon format, topic, goal, and medium. For an item in the ‘automobiles for sale’ section, where space is expensive and readers are skimming for specific criteria like age and price, you will probably produce a list of short Phrases (or mere abbreviations, e.g., ‘fsh’ for ‘finish’) rather than the complete sentences schoolteachers exalt, as in this British example:

[586] Audi 100CD 2.2i auto, big boot, the fashionable safe reliable car, immac-ulate, like new, champagne fsh, long MOT taxed, sunroof, Blaupunkt radio cassette, garaged and carefully looked after, most reluctant sale, bargain £4,850. 081-904-4050 (Motoring Exchange and Mart 17-23/6/1993)

After specifying the generic features of make (‘Audi’), model (‘100CD’), engine size  (‘2.2’), fuel injection (‘i’), automatic transmission (‘auto’), finish (‘fsh’), and inspection (‘MOT’) in technical terms, you can praise user-friendly features in ordinary language, e.g., ‘big boot’ for tons of luggage or ‘sunroof’ for rare sunny days. Auto sales are proverbially risky and buyers can be reassured by stressing the virtues of the make (e.g., ‘fashionable safe reliable’) and the wonderful shape of yours (e.g., ‘immaculate’ like the Holy Virgin, ‘garaged and carefully looked after’) and by vowing that you are ‘most reluctant’ to sell it, as opposed to saying ‘can’t wait to be rid of it’.

54. The richest and most diversified discourse domain (or cluster of domains) is also the most common and universally relevant, namely ordinary conversation. Its has been investigated mainly by the branch of sociology; usually known as conversational analysis, which has developed its own °data-driven fieldwork methods° for observing and recording authentic data in multi-party discourse (II.93). Understandably, this work has not followed °theory-driven formalist linguistics and its technical constructions like competence and grammaticality°. Nor has it followed ‘ordinary-language philosophy’ proposing to sort out well-defined ‘speech acts’ like ‘promise’ or ‘threaten’ and to formulate ‘conversational maxims’, such as ‘be relevant’, ‘be informative’, or ‘be truthful’. Either alliance would be heavily intuitive and non-empirical, based on °isolated invented sentences attributed to anonymous ideal speakers° (cf. II.27, 40, 53; V.59).

55. Instead, conversational analysis has focused on social practices like taking turns, repairing errors or false starts, and opening or closing a conversation. The terms and categories are thus heavily practice-driven, having been worked out from extensive corpuses of recorded conversations, especially in the approach known as ethnomethodology , a term signalling an alliance with ethnography , the anthropological  study of culture. The term was coined by Harold Garfinkel after such terms as ‘ethnoscience’ or ‘ethnomedicine’, which designate people’s commonsense working knowledge of what ‘science’ or ‘medicine’ do (cf. VIII.45). He reasoned that people also have a commonsense ‘methodology’ for ordinary social activities like conversation, like a theory built very close to practice, and use it to jointly construct social reality. This line of reasoning was one of the most productive early forays into a °post-classical approach for bracketing reality as a negotiable discoursal construct and for integrating the constraints of language, world, and society°. Other disciplines, including text linguistics, were held back by allegiance to °classical science° from making °common sense into an accredited explanatory framework°. Ethnomethodology simply started out with the empirical observation that participants usually manage conversation quite well and apply common sense to handle and exploit complexity (IV.7).

56. Ethnomethodologists scrupulously record and transcribe data and seek to provide ‘thick’ rich accounts. The transcripts attempt to register pronunciation and intonation by means of creative respellings along with annotations for tone of voice, audible breathing, silences, and so on, all of which may be relevant to the interaction (III.195). Intriguingly, the heightened ‘realism’ of such a transcript can give an impression of °defamiliarization° from the prevailing conventions of framing conversations in written texts, e.g., in literary novels. Ethnomethodologists attempt to minimize their own framing by not imposing standards of punctuation and orthography that might bias their own use of the data, e.g., by marking off distinct constituents and sentence boundaries.

57. We can examine some conversational data supplied by Manny Schegloff and replayed at a NATO conference I also attended in April 1993:

[587.1] 1 + rings

[587.2] Marcia: hello?

[587.3] Donny: ‘lo Marcia

[587.4] Marcia: yea:h         

[587.5] Donny: =   it’s Donny

[587.6] Marcia: hi Donny

[587.7] Donny: guess what / hh

[587.8] Marcia: what

[587.9] Donny: my ca:r is sta::lled

[587.10] (2 seconds of silence)

[587.11] Donny: ‘n’ I’m up here in the Glen?

[587.12] Marcia: Oh::

[587.13] (4 seconds of silence)

[587.14] Donny: hhh / a:nd / hh

[587.15] (2 seconds of silence)

[587.16] Donny: I don’ know if it’s po:ssible but (hhh)

[587.17] (2 seconds of silence)

[587.18] Donny: see I haveta open up the ba:nk / hh

[587.19] (3 seconds of silence)

[587.20] Donny: a:t uh: in Brentwood? / hh

[587.21] Marcia: =yeah:- an’ I know you want- an’ I wou- an’ I would, but- except I’ve gotta leave in aybout five minutes (hheh)

[587.22] Donny: I gotta call somebody else / right away / okay?

[587.23] Marcia: okay

[587.24] Donny: thanks a lot / bye

[587.25] Marcia: bye:

Telephone conversations offer the simplifying advantage that visual data like gestures, facial expressions, and so on, are not being interchanged, and the analysis can zoom in on the auditory data. Yet as Schegloff pointed out, these data do not manifest the central move, namely the request on Donny’s agenda to be driven to Brentwood by Marcia; the request is only inferrable as the co-referent of ‘it’ in [587.16] and the implicit Target Proposition of ‘I know you want’ in [587.21]. Explicitly, Donny pursues his plan by stating his Locality [587.11], which happens to be an area in Los Angeles where buses, taxis, or auto mechanics are less available, plus the reasons why he is stuck there [587.9] and why he must urgently get away [587.18, 20]. He repeatedly pauses at strategic points where Marcia is supposed to infer his request and offer her help, but she remains silent [587.10, 13, 15, 17, 19], as if the conversation were stalling like his car. When she does decide to respond, she acknowledges ‘knowing’ the unstated Volition (‘want’) and goes from Conditional (‘I would’) to Incapable (I can’t). She gives only a vague and weak reason, since merely ‘leaving in aybout five minutes’ [587.21] doesn’t rule out driving Donny, as compared to saying she has to get to work herself. He doesn’t negotiate but declares his intention to repeat his plan with ‘somebody else’ [587.22], though his second ‘okay?’ in [587.22] might be a final plea, since he has no reason to ask Marcia’s permission to ‘call’. When she ‘okays’ his plan [587.23], Donny goes right into the closing, whose briefness (‘bye’ [587.24]) contrasts starkly both with the opening spread out over five turns [587.2-6] and with Donny’s hesitant statement of his plight spread out over thirteen [587.8-20] if we count Marcia’s silences as meaningful turns.

58. Like other ethnomethodologists, Schegloff views such a discourse as an interactional achievement, even though Donny’s plan failed. The two participants did manage the conversation and got across what they meant. Their turns interlocked closely and efficien tly without breakdowns or random gaps and interruptions. Apparently absent data, such as Donny’s implied request and Marcia’s silences, are a significant part of this achievement, and we can say the data are ‘there’ because the participants themselves assume they are. Moreover, the absences do support Donny’s evident sub-plan to save face by not asking a direct question at once and getting a flat ‘no’. His use of Interrogative intonation in two Tone Groups where he is actually Declaring [587.11, 20] was probably intended to animate Marcia, who first just says ‘oh’ (showing she has understood but isn’t in a co-operative mood), and then gives an answer just as if he had asked [587.12, 21]. Donny again saves face when he does not ask if she is going in his direction when she ‘leaves’: either she isn’t or else she is but doesn’t want to bother with him, so he has nothing to gain and something to lose by asking. His ‘thanks a lot’ [587.24] saves face one last time by suggesting he feels helped rather than rebuffed — not cognitively true but socially functional.

59. Common sense subserves the analysis of such conversations by providing the grounds to reconstruct what is ‘going on’, e.g., in knowing that ‘the Glen’ is a Locality quite a ways from ‘Brentwood’ and that ‘opening a bank’ is an important and responsible Action brooking no delay. We might also assume that Donny can’t fix the car himself and doesn’t want to spend the time and money to wait for a taxi and pay a high fare, and that Marcia has a car of her own and knows Donny well enough to be enlisted. Still, the analysis leads to non-trivial empirical insights, such as that multi-functional events are occurring even in a fairly short and simple conversation, and that people have highly efficien t, fine-tuned ways of achieving them well beyond the faceless ‘speech acts’ and ‘maxims’ of ‘ordinary-language philosophy’ (cf. II.53; V.54).

60. For our own science of text and discourse, we might subdivide conversation into domains with specified goals. One relevant domain would be the discourse of ‘job interviews , which gains importance as the ratio of available jobs to people needing employment gets more skewed and as newer jobs demand more elaborate communicative skills. To hire manual laborers for a factory or farm, you hardly needed to probe the ideology, personality, beliefs, and attitudes of applicants, or their capacities for creatively constructing and redefining their jobs to meet new conditions (cf. V.79; VII.125). But you might well want to do so when hiring financial consultants, public relations managers, or sales personnel who market expensive surplus commodities or who trade on the stock exchange, where innovation is crucial and where the margins of risk versus profit (and legality) are complex and fluctuating.

61. The ‘interview’ conversation has thus acquired the agenda of not merely presenting and discussing qualifications and conditions of work, but of signalling or detecting broader attitudes and aptitudes for interacting flexibly with distinct groups of people and moving money around quickly and shrewdly. The latent conflicts of interest get slipperier too: not just that the prospective employer wants to give lower benefits and the employee wants to get higher ones, but that the employer may seek data which the employee is neither disposed nor well-trained to provide. With rising ‘job mobility’ come the problems of diversifying and retraining: you must seem flexible enough to adapt to the job and succeed but not so flexible that you can be expected to swap jobs or fields again soon when your success attracts attention.

62. The interview conversation normally frames the written text type ‘resumé’, constrained mainly in format (lists rather than a running narrative) and topic (past experience and qualifications, e.g., certificates and school degrees). The script for writing resumés is fairly standardized, and is expounded by commercial handbooks; many prospective employers also give out written ‘application forms’ to elicit easily comparable data. According to Kelly Cheripko, an undergraduate at the University of Florida whose job search was also her discourse analysis project, ‘it is important to list’: ‘at least a 3.0 [B] grade average in high school and/or college’; ‘extracurricular activities, e.g., officer of a service organization, to stress your leadership ability’; and ‘previous job experience to make the employer feel you are “one of the guys”’. Special care can be taken to tailor the data by adding, omitting, or reformulating certain items to make yourself seem qualified but not  overqualified. Kelly suggested ‘altering or inventing experience to fit the prospective job (a clothing store you worked at suddenly carried a complete shoe line) — be creative while attempting to make it sound realistic’. Her survey indicated that ‘the veracity will almost never be checked’ unless problems arise; your fluent Narrative is easily believed (IV.49).

63. The conversational part of the interview is less scripted than is the resumé, but you must still monitor carefully what you say and how you behave. The art seems to lie in navigating a minefield of delicate trade-offs, where too little and too much are equally damaging. You should seem confident but not conceited, respectful but not obsequious, polite but not unctious, complimentary but not fulsome, attentive but not fastidious, committed but not dogmatic, and above all interested in the job but not desperate to get it. Employers also take their risks; applicants may exude ‘poise’ or ‘confidence’ not because their qualifications or expertise are genuinely superior but because their social status is secure — a head start that may have left them poorly equipped to provide new ideas or to handle unforeseen pressures. Hence, interviews can easily discriminate in favor of higher-class applicants along parameters that are irrelevant to job performance — quite similar to the situation in conventional schooling (VII.81, 107).

64. Transcripts of the eight interviews covertly taped by Kelly illustrate some discourse strategies a skilled interviewee can deploy to control the conversation. To ‘sell yourself’, she noted, you should ‘make the interviewer believe you are special, a hard worker, a superior salesperson and leader’ whose ‘thinking correlates with his/her own’. This can be done when describing either your past jobs or your intentions for the job at stake now [588]. Decisive on both counts is the type of job: here, manager in a pricey clothing store for women who buy more for motives of prestige and fashion than practical need, so the methods of ‘selling’ require special persuasion [589].

[588] I learned a lot at Show-Off [another pricey clothing store whose name tells why women buy there] / I helped Mr Chafin [boss and owner] choose clothes for each season […] I was soon promoted to second assistant manager and / then to assistant […] I could’ve been manager but / I hadn’t finished my education / and I felt that obtaining my degree / was my first priority at the time […] I did the / night bookwork / I was the manager on duty // I had control over the/ sales crew and / I helped to select clothes to be bought / I took care of shipments // oh / and I also ran a teen board for the store / it took a lot of time but it was fun […] it was a great experience // I must say that // I liked the responsibility / I liked my staff then / so/ I guess it / was just / a combination

[589] I feel like selling would be my main job / not just / my own selling but being a leader and motivating the girls on duty to sell / any time you’re in retail / selling is most important / the book work and cleaning is also important but selling comes first / some one has to lead and motivate everyone else and that’s / what I’d do

Soon after she submitted her report, Kelly had another interview and ‘capitalized’ on her insights: she was ‘awarded a job which pays much better than most jobs in the Mall’.

65. Another socially relevant domain of conversation is the discourse of waitpersons  in restaurants with customers. My data here come from an under-graduate discourse analysis project by Shavonne Mussatt, who had held such a job herself for five years. Since the fixed salaries are low (Shavonne reported the ‘general hourly wage of $2.01’, just at the allowed minimum), ‘you must rely on tips for the majority of your income’, i.e., on purely voluntary gratuities of fluctuating size. The U.S. guideline rate at the time was 15% of the price of the meal plus drinks, but this may not be widely known or accepted outside major cities. Americans seem uncomfortable about giving money away if they can avoid it, but also about looking stingy or poor in public. The waitperson’s agenda is to carry on conversations that motivate tipping by showing courtesy and personal concern and that minimize the chance of getting ‘stiffed’ (no tip). Mussatt invoked the ‘fine art in manipulating total strangers into giving you money’.

66. She distributed anonymous questionnaires  to waitpersons who described how they act and talk in typical situations: whether their service varies by a customer’s presumed wealth or race [590-92], how they greet customers [593] and converse with them [594-95], whether they enhance tips by recommending higher-priced dishes [596-598], and whether they react openly if a customer is rude [599-600] or leaves an absurdly small tip [601].

[590] poor people have the right to go out too. I don’t expect a big tip from families with young children or elderly people

[591] if you can’t afford the 15% tip then you can’t afford to go out

[592] No. The only color I care about is green

[593] I always attempt to phrase my speech so that the customers think I am doing them a favor out of friendship

[594] I might inquire where they are from or if they are on vacation ask them where they are going. I might try to placate unruly children by giving them something to occupy them

[595] I once told some customers whose son had just graduated that I was an engineering student. They supported the image of a hard-working under-graduate and left me a big tip for my little lie

[596] I usually suggest dishes which experience tells me are broadly popular. These fall in about the mid range of prices

[597] I never suggest the more expensive menu items first […] I don’t wish the customer to suspect my motives

[598] I earn my living this way, so naturally I go where the money is and build the largest check possible while providing the commensurate degree of service

[599] If the person’s deportment is rude, I withdraw my cordiality and treat them with cold efficiency

[600] I treat rude customers like anyone else. However, I may pretend I didn’t hear them when they ask for something

[601] I once returned a tip and said ‘you obviously need this more than I do’

Because the waitperson is the most likely to suffer for mistakes, discourse strategies can shift the responsibility:

[602] passing the buck is part of restaurant life. Once a customer asked for something to not be spicy but I didn’t tell the cook. The customer said it was too hot, so I said that was as mild as the dish came.

[603] Once it took an inordinately long time for a guy to get his dish because I’d forgotten to turn in the order. When he complained I explained that his dish was prepared once but the head chef deemed it to be substandard and insisted on preparing another personally.

Still, conversation cannot control all the factors. The survey showed a consensus that men get higher tips than women, even if the men are gay (which the survey indicated is not uncommon). Various motives were suggested:

[604] Men tip other men more because they think they have a family to support, and assume that women work for ‘fun’. Women tip men more because they enjoy the role reversal of being served by a male

[605] Women tip me better because I make them feel good about themselves by doting on them and complimenting their hairdress and makeup

[605] indicates how a resourceful gay  male can derive a conversational advantage even in rabidly homophobic  societies like the U.S.

67. Another domain of conversation, namely the discourse of customer service in clothing stores, was studied in an undergraduate discourse analysis project by Jason Tunnick, who posed as a buyer with ‘bad taste’ in seven Gainesville stores. In each store, Jason would don some monstrous mix like ‘a pinkish polka dot shirt tucked into a long plaid green pair of pants’ or an ‘oversized multicolored shirt over brownish jeans ripped in fifty places’, certified to be terrible by his girlfriend. He then asked an unsuspecting salesperson if he ‘looked all right’ to see if they would risk losing a sale (and the cash commission) and offending a customer by honestly telling him he looked dreadful or laughing in his face. The girlfriend (who was secretly taping the conversation) would keep saying he looked ‘nice’ or ‘good’, thus raising the stakes for the salesperson to risk fomenting a quarrel between the pair.

68. In only one store did he elicit the emphatic ‘no!’ and the merited burst of laughter. Elsewhere, the salespersons either politely suggested alternatives [606] or else cast about for reasons why a customer could wear such things after all, e.g., that personal ‘feeling’ and ‘comfort’ should decide [607-08] or that fashions are growing bolder [609-10]:

[606] you can wear that together but this T-shirt over here / comes with it also

[607] you can put together anything […] like /wearing your stripes and polka dots together […] as long as you / feel good

[608] I don’t mind it // I mean / but then again like / I said I sometimes // oh god// how would you say / open minded to how things are now / before I really didn’t like the stuff but I think it looks fine / it is just a matter of you / feeling comfortable wearing it / well / women are a lot more used to seeing a lot more brighter and bolder colors / it wasn’t so common for men to see these kind of colors until recently

[609] I definitely like the two plaids together // they are showing a lot of that lately / this season bright colors / are very in // you wouldn’t believe / some of the stuff they’re showing

[610] a lot of people will say it is just wild and everything but it looks good / and they are just jealous that they wouldn’t wear something like it

In an informal opinion poll, other students told Jason they would not risk a frank answer as a salesperson working on commission, but if asked to judge a close friend’s outfit, their answers would vary. The males would all give an honest answer to a male friend, but only 20% of them would to a female friend; half of the females said they would be honest with either gender. If only a casual acquaintance were asking, the uniformly preferred response (60% in all gender combinations) was to find something good to say about the outfit and ignore the bad. At the end of his project, Jason felt discouraged that he had ‘gone to extremes’ and ‘still didn’t get an honest view’.

69. Socially relevant discourse domains like the conversation of job interviews and of customer service in restaurants and stores indicate how ‘insider’ data can shed light on the concrete discoursal strategies and practices of the participants and on their social consequences, e.g., monetary rewards. The analysis deploys a commonsensical model of the domain, like most people do have, as a heuristic for empirical explorations of the ratio between what people are doing and hope to achieve versus what they say (or should say). Such work could in turn suggest ways to design explicit discourse training in school or on the job, e.g., training how to participate in job interviews.

70. Once again, we see the vital importance of dialectically balancing theoretical with practical priorities (cf. V.13, 15, 47). Sweeping changes in the global economy have undeniably intensified the impact of discourse skills upon social well-being and now challenge the relevance of our own theorizing about ‘language’ for social practices. Even °ordinary communicative competence° is quite difficult to capture in a detailed model, and by no means ensures social well-being when economic opportunities are constricting. Our science needs to provide models not just of how such domains do function but of how they might function more reliably, so that the social consequences can be better controlled by the participants who are most affected (I.1, 33, 59f; III.3, 22, 97, 109, 186, 216, 218; IV.163; V.15). Heuristic projects with text types and discourse domains can do more to improve control than putting all our efforts into the search for some definitive theoretical classification.

V.C. Discourse for special purposes: ‘LSP’ and terminology

71. A further major type of °intermediary control system between virtual and actual° is provided by language for special purposes (‘LSP’), and especially by terminology. Here too, practice had until recently run well ahead of theory, aside from some useful work on register and genre, notions which overlap somewhat with ‘style’ but have been oriented more toward social and professional settings than toward literature. Today, research is rapidly expanding, now that the key function of language has been widely recognized in the processes of modern specialization in knowledge domains, Institutional support has been provided for international conferences and for new journals devoted to LSP and terminology.

72. In hindsight, we can readily appreciate the problems that made LSP seem intractable for so long. A primarily linguistic problem is in what sense LSP might count as a ‘language’. It could surely not do so in the same sense as a ‘language for general purposes’ (‘LGP’), since it could never have a complete °lexico-grammar° all its own; it has to share with the lexicogrammar of at least one LPG. Even specialists who had expressly tabulated and precisely defined all their specialized terms must deploy the LGP in order to communicate their knowledge or discoveries to non-specialist trainees or specialists in other fields. LSP is therefore a ‘fuzzy’ system with a doubtful status in °mainstream linguistic theory°.

73. Another linguistic problem is that a model of language for special purposes (‘LSP’) needs to be correlated with a model of discourse for special purposes (‘DSP’). This problem points once again to the unsettled correlation between °virtual language versus actual discourse°. Research on LSP is strongly pressured to study °authentic discourse data° rather than to theorize about °language by itself as an uniform, stable, and abstract system°. The British linguist J.R. Firth suggested that LSP (he called it ‘restricted language’) would be easier to describe than LGP, but he did not specify how far such a description could be done with available linguistic terms and methods.

74. Yet another linguistic problem is the increasingly international context of communication among specialists. One LSP can easily be influenced by other languages besides the LGP upon which it is based and may develop into an ‘interlanguage’ or a mode of ‘code-switching’ (VI.26, 33ff; VII.336). In innovative fields, specific locations and institutes, usually in Center countries, can gain conspicuous leads in new methods and discoveries, the more so when expensive technology like supercomputers, radiotelescopes, or particle accelerators is required. Such locations and their participants also lead in coining new terms (including ones named after themselves, such as the artificial element ‘Berkelium’ produced in Berkeley) and reshaping discourse, e.g., by founding journals and hosting conferences. This factor helps to instate the worldwide influence of English, French, and German terms on LSPs drawn from other LGPs (cf. VI.54). Today, English has won out at least as the language for specialized publications.

75. A final linguistic problem is that, as with styles and text types, we are unsure about which or how many LSPs we should recognize and classify, e.g., general varieties like ‘technical’ or ‘scientific English’, or more specific ones like ‘English for engineering’ or ‘for chemistry’, or still more specific ones like the ‘English for psychological abstracts’ or for ‘computer repair manuals’. New developments may lead not just to new LSPs but to a new sharing of LSPs, as seen now between mathematics and physics in superstring theory, or between chemistry and biology in molecular genetics (cf. III.46, 51, 63-67, 159, 165). It is correspondingly difficult to draw up a linguistic taxonomy of LSPs with satisfactory delicacy and detail. We might get further by adopting a social and cognitive perspective and focusing more on the ‘purpose’ of developing and sharing special knowledge and not just on the ‘language’.

76. This focus leads us to consider institutional problems as well. °Classical views of specialized knowledge and science° naturally relegate language to a subservient role as a mere conveyor of °facts built into reality° (III.146). Anybody who ‘knows the field’ is naively assumed to be skilled in communicating about it, witness the widespread acceptance of a college degree as a higher-division teaching credential without any specific pedagogical training (VII.93, 200). Yet a specialized knowledge base need not support communicative skills; instead, it may only lead specialists to propagate pretentious or impenetrable jargon as a display of power (V.78f; VII.219). For Benjamin Lee Whorf, ‘scientific thought is a specialization of the western Indo-European type of language, which has developed not only a set of different dialectics but actually a set of different dialects; these dialects are now becoming mutually unintelligible’.

77. Classical views also encourage idealized notions of specialized discourse, as we can see in statements like [611-12] (taken from a textbook). Aside from being wholly impractical, the provision in [611] offers no ‘certainty’: every word (except a recent coinage) has a ‘dictionary’ definition, and many have several that are irrelevant to any one ‘scientific discussion’; besides, the ‘defining’ would normally occur when the word is ‘used’, not ‘before’. Similarly, ‘an agreed use of words’ by no means requires a ‘single unvaried meaning’ [612], since uses adapt to context.

[611] We need to make certain that every word in a scientific discussion is used according to a dictionary meaning or is defined in the text before it is put to use.

[612] A definition is an agreed use of words or symbols, each expression having a single limited meaning which remains unvaried.

Real discourse often reveals a margin of instability where terms shift between specialized versus ordinary. The term ‘black hole’ of astronomy is often used for any central point of destruction: the term ‘accommodation’ ordinarily applied to living quarters becomes a mechanism for ‘adaptation’ to maintain ‘equilibrium’ in Piagetian psychology (V.111).

78. No doubt classical views have discouraged institutions from including specific training courses in LSP or terminology within the curriculum of specialized fields. Most such fields and their academic departments neither employ nor train discourse specialists who could teach the courses. As in the familiar ‘seller’s market’, the clients just have to take the product as is (cf. V.94; VII.219). So trainees and pupils get exposed to profuse specialized discourse during intensive content-based instruction and must struggle to spontaneously absorb a specialized ‘vocabulary’ along with some standard rhetorical gestures. Whether and how you do so is largely left to your own improvised tactics, e.g., by memorizing standard definitions from textbooks or by taping lectures and trying to infer the meaning of terms from contexts well enough to imitate the discourse of textbooks or lectures. Openly asking for simple explanations might embarrass both the asker who publicly admits confusion and the specialist who feels accused (justly, no doubt) of not having been clear. But relying on improvised tactics means that the accelerating specialization must eventually engender a °communication crisis° both between teachers and pupils in schools or colleges and between experts and trainees in the workplace (VII.69, 93, 125, 154).

79. Perhaps these institutional problems are secretly welcomed as a means to reinforce power structures, however indecorous it might be to admit it. The supply of specialists is kept small enough to command high salaries. ‘Outsiders’ such as the general public are excluded from discussing the issues or objecting to the allotment of priorities, .funding , and so forth, on social or ecological grounds, e.g., the use of public money to develop high technologies for private showcase industries (VII.29). Science teaching in the public schools conditions ordinary people to a lifetime of deferring to the opinions of ‘experts’ (cf. III.3; VII.49, 63, 219). In all these ways, specialized discourse is not just a ‘seller’s market’, but one expressly designed for small groups of buyers; for everybody else, the main function of the discourse is inverted from accessing knowledge over to withholding it, and from empowering people to develop their potential over to disempowering them to believe that specialized knowledge is just ‘too hard’ or that they are ‘not intelligent enough’. Ironically, these same beliefs get exploited by corporations as pretexts to save money by giving their own trainees simplistic mechanical training:

many organizations are willing to assume that complex tasks can be successfully mapped onto a set of simple, Tayloristic, canonical steps that can be followed without need of significant understanding and insight and thus without need of significant investment in training or skilled technicians; [so] the corporation assumes the reps are untrainable, uncooperative, and unskilled; whereas the reps view the overly simplistic training programs as a reflection of the corporation’s low estimation of their worth and skills (John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid)

Brown and Duguid intriguingly argue that technicians offset this formalistic training by constructing communal narratives to develop and share knowledge in the workplace, as shown by Julian Orr’s field study of service representatives (‘reps’) in a large U.S. corporation (cf. VII.125). Narratives can restore and preserve the cultural memories that formalism and consumerism seek to erase in the name of modern science and technology (I.13; II.27, 121; III.121; VI.12).

80. An egregiously inaccessible specialized discourse domain is bureaucratic discourse , whose arsenal of elaborated phrasings, nominalizations, passives, and circumlocutions allows the bureaucrat to dictate the agenda and sharply restricts the access to knowledge  for ordinary citizens (cf. III. 239). And the bureaucratic discourse with the severest human consequences is surely legal discourse. This domain strives in its own odd way to navigate the deep-lying °contradictions between theory versus practice, and between objective versus subjective in modern societies°. In theory, human actions in general must be so clearly defined that judges can objectively decide, by the ‘letter of the law’, what rights, obligations, penalties, and so on, are at stake; in practice, judges must use discourse to subjectively construct a specific action in terms of what the agent may have meant or intended. This contradiction puts multiple pressures upon legal discourse to define the ‘meaning’ of other discourse domains that have legal consequences, such as contracts. Section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code of the United States [613] tries to protect the ‘terms’ of ‘written memoranda’ or ‘agreements’ against being ‘contradicted’ by some ‘prior’ or ‘oral agreement’, yet allows for them being ‘explained or supplemented’ unless ‘the court finds the writing to have been intended also as complete and exclusive statement’. The court can thus freely decide whether the ‘terms’ should ‘stand’ by making conjectures about what ‘the writing’ was ‘intended’ to be, viz.:

[613] Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented […] by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.

We encounter here another °imposition of formalism°: the explicit claim that ‘terms’ have a single, determinate meaning or interpretation, plus the implicit right to construct the meaning (cf. II.4). So judges and courts can make their own interpretations without sacrificing the official principle that they merely are enforcing the exact wordings.

81. How far their freedom can reach is a favorite topic of Stanley Fish, a professor of both English and Law (and erstwhile champion of ‘affective stylistics’, V.12). He argues that the law can never resolve its basic contradictions because legal discourse can never attain a ‘formal existence’ by ‘writing sentences of such precision and simplicity that their meanings leap off the pa