SPIEL:
Siegener Periodicum zur empirischen Literaturwissenschaft 16, 1997, 40-44.
LITERATURE AND LITERARY THEORY: THE CHALLENGE AHEAD
Robert de Beaugrande
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Die zentrale Aufgabe für soziale Diskurse, darunter auch
literarische, ist und bleibt die Integration von Theorie und Praxis. Dies ist in
der bisherigen Literaturwissenschaft und Literaturtheorie nicht hinreichend
reflektiert, und die Lage verschärft sich zusehends.
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1. Perhaps the next millennium will recall our own recent
decades as the era when literature and literary studies ceased to be
self-sufficient and self-justifying institutions. Probably a convergence of
factors was responsible: the public displacement of literature by visual
entertainment media, including a lavish filmings of novels and short-stories;
the crisis within the arts whose ‘avant-gardes’ had lost their direction and
drifted into abstruse self-alienations that repelled or baffled potential
audiences; and the challenges against the traditional curriculum on all levels
of education.
2. These factors may have also encouraged to the rise of
‘literary theory’ from the 1960s onward. Dissatisfaction had been rising
against ‘close reading’ for being ‘closed reading’ in quest of the
single ‘correct interpretation’ of a literary work in an equally closed
‘canon’. In theory, this quest was incompatible with the ‘openness’ and
‘aestheticity’ of artistic works (Eco 1968; Schmidt 1971); in practice, it
would eventually put the interpreters out of business.
3. The rise of ‘literary theory’ might have been judged
an opportunity to explore new ways of reading literature and possibly of
teaching it as well. But the subsequent developments, as far as I can
reconstruct them from the effusive discourse of the theorists (Beaugrande 1988),
followed a more complex and diversified pattern. Emblematic was the discovery of
‘the reader’, the literary participant who had remained implicit and
invisible; the ‘literature professionals’ had occupied the role themselves
whilst they monumentalised the text and the author.
4. But who was the ‘reader’, and how does ‘reading’
take place? Before the rise of ‘literary theory’, such questions had rarely
been posed. The ‘reader’ was a person who ‘read’ the canonical texts
while going through an academic programme of literary history and biography,
period studies, influence studies, and so on. This training would produce the
‘literature professionals’ whose tacit but consensual ‘professionalism’
would endow their readings with public interest and authority, especially in
their role as teachers.
5. In the 1960s, this staid ambience came under pressure when
the size and diversity of the student population exploded, and the universities
were challenged to ‘modernise’ and ‘rationalise’ their programmes. The
standard professional routines of ‘reading the literary canon’ had to be
reassessed; and authority would have to be documented by academic publications
— whence the famous ‘publish or perish’ syndrome.
6. The quest for single ‘correct interpretation’ of the
canonical text sharply contradicted the demand for newer and broader forums of
publishable discourses about ‘literature’. ‘Literary theory’ now offered
fine opportunities for explicating, critiquing, and transforming our strategies
of reading texts both inside and outside the canon. ‘Literature’ would not
be a ‘canon’ of authorised texts, but a specifiably ‘literary’ class of
creative activities, for which the professionals are highly competent in ways
our ‘theories’ would now explain.
7. Still, two ominous questions persisted. If our older was
reading and teaching had been misguided, restrictive, and intolerant, why should
we be trusted now? And if non-professional readings were also a valid and
valuable, why would ours be special? How far such questions influenced the
evolution of ‘literary theory’ is hard to say insofar as its studied
complexities kept them out of view.
8. Behind the complexity we might discern a few leading
strategies. One strategy (e.g. Riffaterre, Iser) has been to idealise both the
‘act of reading’ and the theoretical ‘reader’. Our prior conventions of
reading were not so much mistakes, it was implied, as partial approximations of
the ideal: insufficiently reflective and not properly conscious of the
intricacies and convolutions of reading which would now be accounted for with
conceptions from philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics, aesthetics,
psychoanalysis, and so on. These accounts would duly increase our competence and
our authority and bring us closer to the explicit ideal. And our authority would
be derived not from the ‘correct interpretation’ but from the ‘leading
theory’.
9. A second and closely related strategy has been for the
theorist to reoccupy the role of the new ‘reader’, sometimes quietly (e.g.
Iser, Jauss) and sometimes noisily (e.g. Fiedler, Bloom), but always purporting
to read just the way the ‘theory’ described (or prescribed). With a few
exceptions (like Hirsch), the theory was not advocated for being ‘correct’
but for being supported by the personal authority and charisma of the theorist
as reader and by the persuasive and ingeniously creative model ‘readings’
offered as demonstrations.
10. A third and more frankly egocentric strategy has been to
formulate our accounts of reading in terms inaccessible not just to ordinary
readers but to many professional ones too. Arcane terminologies, erudite and
unreferenced citations, self-indulgent obscurities, and mystical invocations
became fashionable, notably among the theoreticians (e.g. de Man, Hartman,
Bloom) whose message was that all reading is necessarily ‘misreading’. The
message carried an arresting shock-value for conservative professionals (like
Hirsch) whilst comfortably evading serious critiques of past or present ways of
reading — all just so many ways of ‘misreading’ whose attempts to be
methodical, objective, and systematic were doomed by the ‘free play of the
signifier’.
11. The same cheerful evasion handily applied to these new
theories themselves. To critique them, you must traverse daunting thickets of
obscurity to discover what they actually assert about reading, and whether the
theory fits the theorist’s own practices. Moreover, your demonstrations that
theory is wrong because, to the best of current knowledge, reading simply
doesn’t work that way, or because the theory contradicts its own practices can
be ignored if the theories were officially about ‘misreading’ to begin with:
being wrong confirms their ironic affirmation and celebration of
‘unreadability’.
12. A fourth and radically different strategy would be to
make reading an object of empirical investigation, borrowing upon such fields as
sociology and psychology. Understandably, most of the leading proponents of the
first three strategies have seen good reasons to disregard such work and keep it
out of academic programmes and professional journals, particularly in the U.S.
The most obvious reason would be the strongly anti-empirical bias of the
traditional ‘humanities’, who have positioned both art at large and their
own work inside a defensive opposition against ‘science’. The threadbare
arguments about ‘artistic creativity’ being a mystical process that science
cannot or must not seek to explain will still be devoutly accepted by
professionals who claim to have become experts on that same creativity without
scientific training.
13. More specifically, the empirical strategy menaces
academic decorum in multiple ways. The investigator is often not a ‘literature
professional’ at all nor academically housed in a ‘literature department’,
but in sociology or psychology, or in an interdisciplinary institute. Nor does
the investigator claim to approximate the ideal reader or to produce
authoritative readings of literary texts, but just to be an amateur or admirer
of literature whose real professional concern might be ‘discourse
processing’ or ‘memory schemata’. In return, the activities of whole
groups of real readers get taken very seriously not because they produce
authoritative readings but just because their readings are real.
14. The theorists were perhaps most worried about the
empirical strategy lending a more ‘scientific’ meaning to the term
‘literary theory’ or ‘theory of literature’. In the other three
strategies, the term merely designates some high-level principles of literary
communication which are made to sound novel yet plausible — or
programmatically implausible — by means of charismatic rhetoric. Idealising
‘reader’ and ‘reading’ releases the theorist from having to show that
those principles work, and how. In empirical research, in contrast, high-level
principles are expected to be explicitly based upon the state of empirical
knowledge about human processes and activities, and in ways that lead to
testable hypotheses. Designing tests impels us to identify which factors may
prove significant: how readers and reading may differ by social class, level of
schooling, profession, and so on. We cannot rely either upon the comfortable
uniformity of idealised readers and reading, nor upon the single charismatic
theorist as reader.
15. For me at least, the key question remains whether any of
these four strategies can provide the ‘theoretical’ critiques of reading
that would reliably authorise and guide new and more democratic practices.
During my own work as theorist and practitioner during the 1980s, I happened to
be in the literature department of an America state university, where I was
hired for my work on developmental literacy. As an extension of that work, I
undertook to develop methods suitable for a huge clientele of students in
‘required courses’, who presumably differed dramatically from the
‘reader’ in most ‘literary theories’. They were not ‘literature
majors’ and had no special interest in literature; some even detested it after
their previous school encounters, as I learned through interviews. Since I
refused to spend the semester either patronising them or rushing them through an
indigestible survey of literary history, poetics, aesthetics, and so on, I had
to show them, in understandable and believable terms, why literature is
interesting and how they themselves could do interesting activities with it.
This challenge taught me a great deal, and would be a healthy experience for
‘literary theorists’.
16. I saw the ‘openness’ of literary texts as a prime
factor for encouraging creative responses whose value my students could readily
see. To ensure they felt included, we always started with contemporary texts,
including rock songs by Pink Floyd or U-2, rather than canonical ‘high
literature’. My own readings were offered as user-friendly walk-throughs of
what they would soon be able to do on their own.
17. My practical results, on which I have made several
reports (Beaugrande 1985, 1987, 1989), fully confirmed my hypothesis that
ordinary reading by non-professionals, though idiosyncratic from a historical or
technical point of view, can be intensely interesting. Indeed, I attained a
theory-driven yet empirical definition of ‘interesting’
for a practical criterion of evaluation which the students could readily
understand, and which superseded the traditional but inappropriate standards of
correctness and authorisation. A student’s interpretation is ‘interesting’
in proportion to how much creativity and energy were invested in constructing
and interconnecting rich meanings and associations, including ones making
multiple uses of the ‘same’ elements or images. Such an interpretation
exploits the ‘openness’ of the literary text whilst demonstrating intensely
personal responses, about which the student rather than the teacher or the
textbook is clearly the chief authority.
18. Although my professorial chair in a European university
no longer involves literary studies, I remain convinced that our main challenge
for the future is to integrate inclusive
theory with inclusive practice in all relevant discourse domains at a time
when the ‘modernisation’ and ‘rationalisation’ of society at large and
education in particular are sustaining inclusive
theories (e.g. ‘democracy’, ‘free market’) with exclusive practices (e.g. curtailment of social and professional
benefits) (Beaugrande 1997). Discourse is by nature inclusive, but is being
enlisted against the grain in subtle and complex ways to disempower and silence
ordinary citizens and minority groups.
19. The future of literature and ‘literary studies’ too
hangs upon whether they can make an convincing transition from exclusive to
inclusive. Multicultural and alternative programmes are a hopeful step, but are
under constant and ferocious attack by a right-wing coalition of
‘conservative’ political groups who would allow literature only as a medium
for sustaining mainstream culture, and who have placed intellectuals and artists
on their long list of public enemies and betrayers of ‘human values’ (cf.
Fish 1994). While academic and social progress since the 1960s is now being
rolled back toward radical exclusion, models and strategies for inclusive
discourse must be our top priority in literature and discourse at large.
References
Beaugrande, R. de 1985. Poetry
and the ordinary reader: A study in literary response. In: Empirical Studies in
the Arts 3: 1-21.
Beaugrande, R. de 1987. The
naive reader: Anarchy or self-reliance? In: Empirical Studies in the Arts 5/2:
145-170.
Beaugrande, R. de 1988. Critical
discourse. Norwood, NJ: Ablex
Beaugrande, R. de 1989. Naive
readers and creative response. In: SPIEL 8/2:
233-254.
Beaugrande, R. de 1997. New foundations for a science of text
and discourse. Greenwich, CT: Ablex.
Eco, U. 1968. L’opera aperta. Milano:
Bompiani.
Fish, S.E. 1994. There is no such thing as free speech.
Oxford: OUP.
Schmidt,
S.J. 1971. Ästhetizität. Munich: Bayrischer Schulbergverlag.